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Abstract There is a wide literature about business incubators (BIs), especially about
successful cases in high tech and knowledge intensive industries. Despite that, there
is neither a viable integrative theory of effective business incubation nor clear guide-
lines about the preconditions for establishing BIs and their management. Such theory
and guidelines are urgently needed because there is increasing evidence in the
literature that, despite many successful cases and public policies supporting business
incubation, most of BIs are not successful at all and serious doubts have emerged
about the general effectiveness of business incubation and the advisability of invest-
ing public money in it. Based on a systematic literature review of the poor and
scattered theoretical knowledge of effective business incubation, general principles
are proposed to decide when a BI should be established and what it should do to be
effective. The research is limited to non-profit BIs whose main goal is regional
economic development as they represent the overwhelming majority of operating BIs.
Keywords Business incubators . Business incubation . Theoretical contribution . New
ventures . Start-ups
Introduction
According to the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA), the world’s
leading association of business incubators (BIs) based in the USA, business incuba-
tion is a ‘process’ of business support: ‘Business incubation is a business support
process that accelerates the successful development of start-up and fledgling compa-
nies by providing entrepreneurs with an array of targeted resources and services’ [33].
The UK Business Incubation has a more traditional approach and identifies business
incubation with ‘location’ and ‘services’ provided: ‘Business incubation provides
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growth SMEs and start-ups with the ideal location to develop and grow their businesses,
offering everything from virtual support, rent-a-desk through to state of the art labora-
tories and everything in between. They provide direct access to hands-on intensive
business support, access to finance and expertise and to other entrepreneurs and
suppliers to really help businesses and entrepreneurs to grow—faster’ [51]. The
Association of German Business Incubators (ADT) and the Asian Association of
Business Incubation (AABI) provide similar definitions focused on the kind of
provided services. All the different definitions focus on the services and resources
provided but with different accents.
The main expectation of policy makers that invest public money in business
incubation is that incubator graduates have the potential to create jobs, revitalize
cities and regions, diversify local economies, commercialize new technologies,
transfer technology from universities and major corporations and strengthen local
and national economies in general. So they may have many different goals and vary
in the way they deliver their services, in their organizational structure and in the types
of clients they serve. Different classifications and typologies of business incubation
have been identified. The most effective is probably the one that identifies four main
categories [3]: public non-profit incubators (Business Innovation Centre from a
popular EU policy), private independent profit-oriented incubators, university busi-
ness incubators, private corporate profit-oriented incubators. Most of the BIs across
the world are non-profit organizations focused on regional economic development
and even in the USA about 94% of operating BIs belong to such a typology, and only
6% of USA incubators are for-profit entities, usually set up to obtain returns on
shareholders investments [25]. That is why the present research focuses on non-profit
BIs whose main goal is regional economic development.
The increasing focus on knowledge intensive start-up firms and their potential for
early international growth in the global economy has increased the attention for BIs as
the main public tools to create such ‘international new ventures’ [36] and ‘born global
firms’ [39]. As a consequence, the number of BIs has been increasing, as well as their
geographical spread across the world. The first BI in history is thought to be the
Batavia Industrial Center, opened in Batavia, NY, in 1959, in order to revitalize that
neighbourhood after the closure of a large factory. The phenomenon did not become a
popular one until the late 1970s, and in 1980, it is estimated that 12 BIs were active in
the USA [33]. Starting from the beginning of the 1980s, the number of BIs in the
world has been growing rapidly from 200 up to over 3,000 in 2000 ([52], p. 27) and
around 3,600 in 2010 [4]. In the USA, even after the dot-com bust of the early 2000s,
the number of business incubation programs has continued to increase: In late 2005,
NBIA estimated that approximately 1,100 BIs were operating in the USA, up from
950 in 2002; even more impressive is the growth in the number of operating
incubation programs since the late 1990s; since 1998, the number of incubators in
the USA has nearly doubled [33]. UK Business Incubation reports that there are
approximately 300 BIs in the UK today [51], and the Association of German
Business Incubators reports 212 such facilities in Germany [5]. The Asian Associa-
tion of Business Incubators, which includes among its members both incubators and
national associations of incubators (from China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan,
Philippine, Thailand and Vietnam), estimates 1,000 incubators in Asia (except
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Middle East), 850 incubators in Western Europe, around 380 in South and Central
America, 180 in Eastern Europe and 180 in Africa, Middle East and others [4].
Despite increasing numbers, diffusion and popularity of BIs and related associations,
not to speak of related literature, public funding, public policy and promotion, ‘empirical
research evidence clearly suggests that they tend to fail in supporting entrepreneurship,
innovation, and regional development and, therefore, they do not fulfil their expected
role as policy instrument’ ([48], p. 460). There is plenty of literature and data claiming
the positive contribution of BIs, with specific reference to the number of companies
and jobs created [34, 25], but most of the time such claims from incubators’
associations are not methodologically sound evaluations of effectiveness because
they just measure intended effects and do not compare them with unintended ones
[6]: They do not consider that some firms would have grown and would have been
funded even outside the incubator; some others moved into the incubator at a later
stage of their growth, attracted by cheap office space, facility or public funding.
As has been verywell clarified, suitable methods for analysing the effectiveness of BIs
are the before-and-after comparison and the control-group concept [48]: ‘Effectiveness’
is understood as differences in regional and business performance after the use of
business incubation (longitudinal analysis); ‘control-group’ concept compares
characteristics from a group of firms or regions taking advantage of BIs and
a control group not utilising BIs’ facilities (cross-sectional analysis), with both
groups selected randomly or according to a set of criteria.
The most comprehensive and methodologically sound evaluations of BIs have
been undertaken in Europe and in the USA. A multi-level investigation in Germany,
including 1,021 businesses and 108 technology-oriented BIs, shows that the potential
of technology-oriented start-ups is too small and, overall, decreasing, which fails to
promote the sustainable success of the incubation industry in Germany [47]: (1) At
least one third of the firms in BIs are active in low-value service sectors or commerce,
(2) 19% of the firms were already more than 2 years old when they entered the
facilities and thus not newly founded, (3) only 3% of firm founders would not have
started their businesses without the existence of incubators and (4) attracting suitable
tenants from other regions is unlikely due to the immobility of firm founders.
A study conducted among 116 science parks (they can be considered as a specific
typology of BIs: close to university or research centres, sell or lease spatially
contiguous land and/or buildings at high prices because of prestigious locations,
accept subsidiaries of international firms or already established firms and are focused
on ‘spatial’ integration) in the USA casts serious doubts about their regional employ-
ment effects in comparison to regions without science parks and with similar char-
acteristics [29]: Just a quarter of the 116 analysed science parks are evaluated as
successful and success depends on how well equipped is the region in which they are
located and on a first mover advantage (the first science parks tend to be more
successful than late comers).
Extensive studies on the effectiveness of BIs and science parks have been con-
ducted in the UK for many years [32]. In one case, 130 businesses originated from
science parks, and 121 from outside such incubators were compared: The businesses
in science parks exhibit a higher failure rate of 38% compared with the 32%
businesses outside such incubators [53]. Even more striking are some results about
employment, as they reveal that the mean employment growth rates of firms located
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on science parks and those located off science parks are virtually identical [45].
Empirical research also suggests that level of technology in incubated firms is not
superior to not incubated ones [12, 54], that there are time-delayed effects because of
the science park location on the performance of start-ups [16] and no ‘high incidence
of technology transfer despite the fact that many were established with that goal in
mind’ ([37], p. 299).
On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that BIs are especially effective
in reaching political goals: a tangible real estate investment to be pictured and shown
to the public as a piece of evidence of a public policy for innovation, qualified
employment and economic growth. A radical solution to avoid wasting public money
on ineffective BIs would be ‘that technology-oriented business incubators should be
run as private organisations without public funding’ ([48], p. 469) so that it is the
market itself that selects the effective ones and not the flow of public funding. In fact,
the already quoted empirical evidence suggests that they do not provide significant
stimulus for individuals starting a business; they do not increase the likelihood of firm
survival, innovativeness or growth and they are a very modest contributor to regional
economic development: ‘Using the logic of the NBIA, creating on average 20,000
jobs per year in a nation with a labour force of 147.4 million and an unemployed rate
of 5.5% (in 2004) is not really a big push’ ([48], p. 469).
Curley, Curley et al. [14] propose a radical critique to the traditional business
incubation process that culminates in a business plan, drafted with experts’ advice
and suggest an ‘experiment-related decision process’. Along with many other
researchers, they agree that the business incubation industry has been artificially
fuelled by the provision of subsidies and grants (with mediocre outcomes) and
suggest that, despite the failure of incubators, there is ‘the need to expand the
incubation process beyond the limits of the business plan, to encompass experimen-
tation and the simulation of new business concepts in an experimental laboratory
environment’ ([14], p. 1).
Despite significant empirical evidence against its effectiveness, business incuba-
tion is still a popular public policy and phenomenon. Many successful cases quoted in
the literature and in the public debate suggest that business incubation can be
effective under some circumstances.
Research Question
As has been shown in the previous section, despite significant empirical evidence against
the effectiveness of business incubators, many successful cases of business incubation
exist and significant public money continues to be available for business incubators. That
means there is a great need of theory, criteria and guidelines about the preconditions for
establishing business incubators and their management, so that it can be decided when a
business incubator should be established and how it should be managed. This would
avoid the flow of public money into business incubators for political purposes, just
because public money is available, regardless of their effectiveness.
The systematic literature review that follows tries to identify, collect and system-
atize the already existent theoretical knowledge of business incubation and is
intended as a ‘theoretical contribution’ in the direction of a comprehensive theory
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of effective business incubation. I accept the recent definition of ‘theoretical contri-
bution’ by Corley and Gioia [13] in the Academy of Management Review that ‘rests
largely on the ability to provide original insight into a phenomenon by advancing
knowledge in a way that is deemed to have utility or usefulness for some purpose’
([13], p. 15) with two subcategories underlying each of these main two dimensions:
‘revelatory’ or ‘incremental’ originality and ‘practical’ or ‘scientific’ utility.
The assumption I also endorse by Corley and Gioia [13] is that ‘our theories
should be problem driven [..], it should be embraced the fact that we are a profession
(academia) studying another profession (management), so our orientation toward
theoretical contribution should include an explicit appreciation for applicability’
([13], p. 22). It means that the resolution of the real problem—establishing and
managing effective business incubators—is the main purpose of this theoretical
contribution, rather than abstract derivations of hypothetical formulations.
Considering the controversial empirical evidence about business incubation and
the fact that it is a ubiquitous and popular phenomenon, it is expected that the present
contribution will ‘reveal’ new insights to scholars and practitioners about the estab-
lishment and management of effective business incubators. In that sense, it aims to be
a ‘theoretical contribution’ that rests on ‘revelatory originality’ and ‘practical utility’.
Method
In order to identify what it is known on the subject, it is indispensable to systemat-
ically review the existing literature. To execute a literature review, the methodology
must ensure, on the one hand, that it is exhaustive in scope and, on the other hand,
that it is traceable and replicable to secure objectivity. Considering the issues that
have arisen in the introduction, I conducted a literature review about the theoretical
knowledge of business incubation with a fairly wide scope. In management science, a
systematic literature review approach has been introduced by David and Han [15] and
enhanced by Newbert [35]. A six-step process—instead of the nine steps of David
and Han [15]—is applied to bring conceptual clarity into the theory of business
incubation. I will discuss each step in turn:
Step 1 Search exclusively for published journal articles. As already refined by New-
bert, search was limited to articles published in ‘scholarly journals’. According
to the original argumentation of David and Han, the exclusion of book chapters
and unpublished work enhances the quality by requiring a review process.
Following this logic, the limitation on only scholarly journals further increases
the quality due to a rigorous peer review process prior to publication.
Step 2 Search the ABI/Inform and EBSCO. ABI/Inform and EBSCO were chosen as
key databases. Because business incubators have been examined from different
disciplines and theoretical perspectives, the multidisciplinary ABI/In-
form database provides an appropriate base. To ensure an exhaustive coverage,
the ABI/Inform search was enhanced by an additional search in the EBSCO
database to include all studies from economic and management journals.
Step 3 Ensure articles’ substantive relevance by requiring both the following two
keywords to be contained in title or abstract: business incubat* and theor*.
As explained by David and Han [15], the asterisk at the end indicates that
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variations of the word were permitted. The two selected keywords ensure the
identification of most of the articles whose claim is to deal with theoretical
issues related to business incubation. Carrying out steps one to three on the
literature yielded 27 articles from ABI/inform and 13 articles from EBSCO
(by using the only keyword business incubat* resulted in larger pool of 206
articles in the ABI/inform database and 140 in EBSCO—duplicated articles
included—but I did not review those articles because I assumed that the
world theor* should also be included in the title or abstract if a theoretical
contribution was claimed).
Step 4 Consolidate results from ABI/Inform and EBSCO to eliminate duplicate
articles. After applying criterion 3, the number of articles remaining was 40,
with still some articles in common from both databases. Six duplicates
articles were identified and eliminated in the step, so that applying step 4
resulted in a pool of 34 articles from both databases.
Step 5 Ensure substantive relevance through reading all abstracts for substantive
context. Articles retained had to indicate a contribution to the theoretical
knowledge of business incubation in the abstract. This criterion allowed me
to reduce the number of articles from 34 to 24.
Step 6 Ensure substantive relevance through reading all remaining articles in their
entirety for substantive context, at least the ones that were accessible to us
in full text. In fact, Povilaitis and Čiburienė [38] and Kučinskienė and
Fominienė [26] were not accessible to us because they were written in
Lithuanian. The full text of Lender and Dowling [28] was not available in
the databases and library resources and I was unable to retrieve it, so that in
the end I had the opportunity to read just 21 articles in full text. Articles that
did not possess substantive context were eliminated from the pool after
reading the full text. For example, the article by Todorovic and Suntornpithug
[49] met all criteria, even passed step 5 because after reading the abstract, it
seemed as if they provided valuable findings to the theory of business
incubation. But after reading this article in its entirety, the article was
removed because, although it treats the topic of university business incuba-
tors and develops a set of propositions, it focuses exclusively on the role and
characteristics of universities and not on university business incubation
itself. Hughes et al. [23] adopted the networked incubator as a context for
the study of entrepreneurial orientation in emerging young high technology
firms, but its theoretical contribution was revealed to be not about business
incubation. Markman et al. [31] make reference to business incubation
theory, but the main focus is the structures and strategies of university
technology transfer offices as ‘technology intermediaries’ between labs
and business incubators. Jones et al. [24] were revealed to be about eco-
nomic development and not really ‘business incubation’.
By applying this last filter on the sample, four more articles were removed (Table 1).
Having followed this systematic approach, I believe that the review comprises the
most significant theoretical contributions to business incubation that have been
published in ‘scholarly journals’. For the subsequent section, the pool of 17 articles
selected through the systematic literature review is my ‘unit of analysis’. I read each
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article of the final pool and extracted information. Given the low number of articles,
the information gathered from them was not systematic but critical nevertheless.
Results
In line with the stated impression by other scholars and a previous literature review on
business incubation [19], the systematic literature review reveals that the number of
contributions to the theoretical knowledge of business incubation is very limited in
number. In fact, I have been able to identify just 17 relevant articles and to read 21.
It is worth noting that the articles are all in different journals and there are just two
journals in which multiple articles appear, the Journal of Technology Transfer (three
articles from the same authors) and the Journal of Business Venturing (two articles).
This is a sign that the theoretical contributions to business incubation are not just
limited in numbers but scattered around in the literature and not part of a systematic
debate. It is also evident that the interest in the theory of business incubation is a
recent phenomenon despite business incubation being a widespread phenomenon for
a good many years: 13 of the 17 articles are from 2004 onwards, and six are from
2008 onwards.
In the following section, the 17 articles are divided according to the five primary
research orientations that it has been possible to identify: (1) general contributions to
business incubation theory, (2) theoretical contributions regarding business incuba-
tion in emergingmarkets, (3) theoretical contributions regarding the efficacy of business
incubation, (4) theoretical contributions regarding incubator–university linkages and (5)
theoretical contributions regarding ‘networked incubators’.
General Contributions to Business Incubation Theory
The most systematic effort towards a theory of business incubation is in the article by
Maital et al. [30]. It outlines a grounded theory of business incubation, driven by case
studies, empirical results and field work. The authors studied in detail 38 projects
inside an Israeli business incubator, rating them along three dimensions: technology,
market potential, management skills, leadership capabilities and entrepreneurship
embodied in the team. The last dimension was by large the most important key
variable to explain the success of business incubation projects in Israel, whereas
‘funding’ is key variable to explain the success of business incubation projects in
India. In conclusion, the empirical evidence supports three main principles that, the
Table 1 Summary of selection filter: ABI/inform and EBSCO
Fylter type Description ABI result Ebsco result Total
3 substantive business incubat* and theor* in title or abstract 27 13 40
4 duplicates Deletion of duplicates articles found in EBSCO 27 7 34
5 substantive Remaining abstracts read for substantive relevance 17 7 24
6 substantive Remaining and accessible articles read for relevance 16 5 21
Remaining relevant articles 12 5 17
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authors claim, are common across countries: (1) The paradox of market emulation—
in other words, successful incubators both emulate market conditions (for example,
choosing projects according to the same criteria that venture capitalists use in the
market increases incubated firms’ success rates) and shield their ‘infants’ from them;
managing this paradox is fraught with difficulty, not least because it is often not
explicitly recognized: ‘a general theory of incubation will include principles that
guide incubation processes toward optimal resolution of the market failure-market
emulation conflict’ ([30], p. 4). (2) Resolving the key make-or-break constraint—in
other words, in every country, there are many constraints that hinder ultimate business
success of incubator projects, but there is always a more important and key one: “a
theory of business incubation should include principles that guide identification of the
key ‘resonating’ constraint and provide direction toward reducing or eliminating it”
([30], p. 4). (3) Alignment with local and national cultures—a theory of incubation
should help to reinforce those aspects of the national or local culture that act
positively on incubation’s success and mitigate or eliminate those aspects of
culture that act negatively; a typical mistake in that sense is that incubator
processes imitate those prevalent in America without any critical adaptation to
national cultures but “American culture is in many ways an ‘outlier’, or a
special case, with, for instance, individualism and risk-taking far more pro-
nounced than in [..] Europe and especially Asia” ([30], p. 4). These three principles
are not yet a theory of business incubation because an interconnected system of
propositions that makes a theory is still missing, but they are a significant step in that
direction as they identify three elements of such a theory: the market/incubation
dilemma, the key constraint and the national culture.
Hackett and Dilts [19] developed a systematic literature review on business
incubators and business incubation: The review revealed that much attention had
been devoted to the description of incubator facilities and less attention on the
incubatees, the innovation they seek to diffuse, the incubation outcomes that had
been achieved and the incubation process itself.
Given the paucity of theoretically grounded models of business incubation in the
literature, Hackett and Dilts [20] advanced a real option-driven incubation process
model in which ‘business incubation performance’ (measured in terms of incubate
growth and financial performance at the time of incubator exit) depends on three
variables: ‘selection performance’ (refers to the degree to which the incubator
behaves like an ‘ideal type’ venture capitalist when selecting emerging organizations
for admission to the incubator), ‘monitoring and business assistance intensity’ (refers
to the degree to which the incubator helps incubatees: time intensity of assistance
provided and comprehensiveness) and ‘resource munificence’ (refers to the abun-
dance of incubator resources: availability, quality and utilization). The model sug-
gests the following propositions/hypothesis: (1) Business incubation performance is
positively related to selection performance, (2) business incubation performance is
positively related to intensity of monitoring and business assistance efforts and (3)
business incubation performance is positively related to resource munificence. These
conclusions mean that the more incubators behave like venture capitalist firms and
the more intense their business support is, the better incubator performance can be
expected, at least as far as static efficiency is concerned. The theory considers
business incubation as a ‘process’ and is ‘option driven’ because business incubation
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performance is a function of the incubator’s ability to ‘create options through the
selection of weak-but-promising intermediate potential firms for admission to the
incubator, and to exercise those options through monitoring and counselling, and the
infusion of resources while containing the cost of potential terminal option failure’
([20], p. 48).
Hackett and Dilts [21] tested their model and collected data from 53 incubators
operating in the USA in order to systematically examine the incubation process with a
set of pre-tested scales. Their empirical investigation offers (1) new, validated scales
for measuring the process of incubating new ventures; (2) empirically based refine-
ments to their option-driven theoretical model of the incubation process and (3) data
on business incubation outcomes that are useful for incubator planning and bench-
marking purposes.
Leblebici and Shah [27] argue that neither theory nor empirical investigation about
business incubation can be understood without taking the history into account
explicitly: in their contribution organization theory and history meet, in order to
describe and explain the development of the business incubation industry in the
world. Their contribution is in the typical agency-structure debate: ‘is organisational
life determined by intractable structural constraints or is it actively created through
strategic actions of their agents, that is, management?’ ([27], 359). Their main
argument, based on the concept of agency, is that ‘agency is always oriented towards
the past, the present and the future, and this temporal quality of agency is necessary to
merge organisational theory with organisational history. We applied these ideas to a
case study of organisational form – the business incubator’ ([27], p. 375). So that
their main contribution to business incubation theory is to provide evidence of the
importance of history in theory building.
In a pioneer study, Allen and McCluskey [2] collected data from 127 incubators in
the spring of 1987, after no more than 10 years of significant business incubation.
They did so in order to discover relationships between structure, policies and service
variables with special attention on determining what, if anything, influences incuba-
tor performance. They discovered that ‘tenants generally underutilize professional
business advisory services and, when used, often evaluate them unfavourable’ ([2], p.
64). Their main general finding is that ‘policy prescriptions were not related to
performance outcomes. This [..] reinforces the common contention that business
incubators are idiosyncratic reflections of local conditions’ ([2], p. 74), so that the
common practice of stakeholders specifying arrangements, services or policies, to
which incubators must conform, is called into question: ‘what works in one incubator
may not work for another even if it shares many of the same enterprise development
purposes. The uniqueness of each incubator seems largely due to the local entrepre-
neurial environment and the needs and resources of stakeholders’ ([2], p. 74). Based
on these findings, managers must know as much as possible about the entrepreneurial
environments and carve out a niche in that environment, adapting their strategies to
the environment.
Burnett and McMurray [10] focused on family businesses and conducted a
qualitative study on 12 family start-up firms in order to explore how they experienced
the business incubation process. One of the main findings is that ‘for family start-ups,
the boundaries between personal relationships and business relationships appeared to
dissolve or overlap, and relationships with other tenants and the incubator manager
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developed from a strong trust base and camaraderie’ ([10], p. 60). This study shows
that ‘small family start-ups relocate into incubators for a variety of family circum-
stances; for example to avoid isolation and to seek out different types of business
networks, support and personal friendships’ ([10], p. 72). The incubation literature
shows a lack of family research studies conducted within incubator context, and
although this study is an exploratory one, the three research questions addressing why
family start-up firms choose to locate their businesses in an incubator, what services
they seek and what types of relationships they establish, sheds light on family
behaviour in incubators and thus provides a contribution to the literature.
Rice [40] analyses the business assistance programs inside business incubators.
The entrepreneurial ventures located in an incubator are, in fact, ‘consumers’ of those
outputs and operate in an interdependent co-production relationship with the incuba-
tor. This study explores the types of business assistance provided through co-
production, the modes of co-production and factors that affect the variability of
impact. The allocation of the time of the incubator manager, the intensity of inter-
vention, the breadth of co-production modalities deployed and the readiness of the
entrepreneur to engage in co-production are revealed as factors affecting the output
elasticities related to co-production inputs. Through a multiple case study methodol-
ogy, this exploratory study illuminates the nature of the co-production dyadic rela-
tionship between the incubator manager and the entrepreneur and defines co-
production modalities. In addition, it provides insight into the factors that affect
output elasticities. These observations led to the development of a typology of
incubator companies based on the dimensions of maturity and readiness: (1) anchor
tenants: entities that have a reason to be in the incubator, pay their bills reliably and
therefore support the financial needs of the incubator and neither need nor want co-
production input from the incubator manager; examples include accounting and law
firms, economic development agencies, university technology transfer offices and so
forth; (2) long shots: companies that have substantial need for co-production but are
not ready to engage; they benefit from the supportive environment offered by an
incubator and need time to mature; (3) up-and-comers: companies with significant
resource gaps that can be addressed through co-production; these companies are run
by entrepreneurs, who are aware of the gaps, recognize the potential for co-
production to help them resolve the gaps and are willing to engage; (4) superstars:
companies that have matured beyond up-and-comer status and require minimal
coproduction input from the incubator manager, even though their readiness to
engage remains high; for the most part, they are capable of addressing crises and
sustaining their development without the involvement of the incubator manager; they
are likely to graduate from the incubator in the near term, but while still in the
incubator, act as role models for up-and-comers and long shots. The output elasticity
of the incubator manager inputs is affected by the readiness of the entrepreneur to
engage in co-production. This readiness appears to be related to awareness by the
entrepreneur of the firm’s gaps in knowledge, skills and resources; recognition of the
potential of the incubator manager to help fill those gaps and willingness to engage in
co-production. Similarly, the output elasticity of the entrepreneur inputs is affected by
the readiness of the incubator manager to engage in co-production. However, read-
iness of the incubator manager does not appear to be related to awareness, recognition
and willingness. Generally, the admissions process makes incubator managers aware
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of the gaps in their firms’ resources, they recognize that the incubator and its
supporters have resources that can be brought to bear and they are willing to engage.
Instead, incubator manager readiness is related to capacity for committing sufficient
time to co-production to achieve a level of intensity required for impact, as well as the
breadth of co-production modes implemented. Thus, readiness of the incubator
manager is related to the balance between co-production and non-co-production
activities of the incubator. In conclusion, Rice [40] has illuminated the concept of
interdependent co-production of services, specifically business assistance programs
offered through business incubators, and the lessons learned may be useful in any
business incubation situation in which an incubator and an entrepreneur are engaged
in co-production of business assistance.
Theoretical Contributions Regarding Business Incubation in Emerging Markets
Young-Ho Nam [55] interviewed ten high-tech venture founders in Korea and
realized the first research on incubator organizations in Korea. Based on these inter-
views, their experience at incubator organizations and subsequent performance, 11
hypotheses were verified. The success of founders is positively correlated with the
following opportunities in the incubator organization: the opportunity to prepare a
business plan, to develop a prototype of a new product, to be acquainted with other
disciplines, to work together as a team and to acquire various kinds of capabilities
such as market-specific know-how, entrepreneurial skills and financing know-how at
incubator organizations. On the contrary, success is not correlated with the opportu-
nity to acquire technological know-how and traditional managerial skills at incubator
organizations. An additional significant finding is that ‘government labs are more
favourable incubators than private labs, in that government labs provide more
autonomy in carrying out projects and wider viewpoints in understanding an industry
or market’ ([55], 295).
Riddle et al. [41], employing Eisenhardt’s case-based theory development
approach (1989), studied a Dutch incubator located in The Hague, providing services
exclusively to transnational diasporan entrepreneurs (that is migrants and their
descendants who establish entrepreneurial activities that span the national business
environments of their countries of origin and countries of residence) and leveraged
case findings to generate theory about the role that incubators can play in helping
these entrepreneurs overcome the institutional challenges that they face. The study
illustrates how the application of a stakeholder approach illuminates why incubator
goals and services vary, identifies which outcome measures are appropriate to apply
to a given incubator’s activities and explains variability in incubator performance
against those metrics. It also illustrates how the multi-territorial nature of a transna-
tional business incubator’s stakeholder set can affect the goals that it sets, the way in
which it selects its clients and the types of business support and mediation services
that it provides. In that sense, it clarifies: (1) that in order to evaluate the performance
of a business incubator and define the metrics, the main stakeholders must be
identified (local policy maker or national policy maker, international organizations
or private investors or a university) and their geographical location and (2) that
outcome indicators must be put in relation to goals because different business
incubators do not have the same outcome objectives.
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Tsai et al. [50], drawing on the national innovation system and business incuba-
tion experience in Taiwan, systematically review the dynamics of innovation by
investigating the inter-relationships between university, industry, government and
the extended knowledge value chain for incubation. Their assumption is that incu-
bation acts at the meso-level as a critical interface between macro-innovation systems
and micro-business ventures, and their main contribution is related to the linkages
between business incubators and the overall national innovation system. They pro-
pose the concept of ‘virtual business incubation’ (already introduced and used by
other authors such as [43, 46]) as a new style of business incubation in emerging
markets in which tenants are incubated from their own location through the incuba-
tion centre’s information infrastructure.
Theoretical Contributions Regarding the Efficacy of Business Incubation Itself
Based on a number of case studies, Bee [7] claims that ‘incubator operators often
create competitors for local companies that are well established and profitable
taxpayers. [..] Incubators reduce regional tax revenues since they substitute estab-
lished, profitable companies, with strong tax streams, for start-up companies that are
profitless and therefore unable to pay taxes’ (p. 11).
According to Bee [7], business incubators create a distortion in the market, a
transfer of money, with no real creation of wealth but rather consumption of wealth,
the only exception being few high tech and especially biotech ones ‘when they are
designed to meet a real, not theoretical, barrier to entry, provided the community has a
substantial market potential for specialized start-ups in emerging technologies’ (p.
12). The biotech industry, in fact, has real barriers to entry because of the need for
expensive, but rarely used, wet labs that meet legal standards.
Gstraunthaler [18] poses the question whether business incubators have been
installed due to the real economic demand to help all the promising start-ups to
develop or if they serve primarily political goals. The contribution is based on in-
depth interviews with the management of all seven business incubators of Lithuania
and in that sense it is limited to one country. Despite being based on a single country,
its findings seem to be generalizable to the many peripheral or less endowed nations
or regions that are establishing business incubators for local economic development:
‘The business incubators have so far been unable to attract venture capital for their
tenants. None of their tenants has successfully applied for venture capital funding
either. [..] the start-ups they host see public institutions as the sole source of the
capital they need to grow. [..] Securing public funding is seen as a major task of the
business incubators as the management fee is a major source of funding. Their
success is strongly linked to the support of the public funding institutions’ ([18], p.
415).
One of the main activities of Lithuanian business incubators’ management is not
really providing assistance to carefully selected tenants, but renting their properties to as
many tenants as possible and drafting and managing EU projects in order to raise funds,
so that ‘what made these property developments so attractive was the available public
money, particularly from the European Union. As long as the money keeps flowing,
there is a strong incentive to grow. These incentives do not derive from a strong demand,
but rather seem to be driven by the availability of money’ ([18], p. 415–416).
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Theoretical Contributions Regarding Incubator–University Linkages
Rothaermel and Thursby [42] focused on business incubators’ linkages to universities
and tested a set of hypotheses through following 79 start-up firms incubated at the
Georgia Institute of Technology over the 6-year period between 1998 and 2003. Their
results indicate a trade-off: Incubated firms without university ties (that means new
ventures that do not rely on a strong university link either through a technology
licence or having one or more university faculty as part of the senior management
team) were ‘more likely to fail but also more likely to successfully graduate within a
timely manner’ ([42], p. 1089).
The policy implication is a balanced approach combining the necessary university
link with a team of professional managers, and when the university linkage is through
a university licence, incubator firm failure is reduced while still allowing for timely
graduation from the incubator.
Aernoudt [1] focuses on the links between incubators and business angel networks
as opposed to university linkages and on the significant differences between Europe
and USA. In fact, as far as the role of universities is concerned, he claims that the
importance of the links between universities and incubators is greatly overestimated
in respect to the role of business angels and finance: ‘good-quality houses, four-star
hotels, good restaurants, and proximity to an international airport are much more
important than proximity to the university’ ([1], p. 131), and even the most outstand-
ing successes of university business incubators, like the Cambridge Science Park in
the UK, show weak or no connection to the university: ‘its success is not due to the
fact that academics spun out of Cambridge colleges to translate ideas into commercial
reality’ but ‘success is due to the image of one of the world’s greatest seats of learning
and this cachet has encouraged people to start up [..] there or relocate from outside.
Indeed many businesses have no connection with the University’ ([1], p. 131).
Theoretical Contributions Regarding ‘Networked Incubators’
Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi [9] focus on a special typology of incubator, the ‘networked
incubator’ [22], which is a hybrid form of the archetypal business incubator, charac-
terized by a for-profit orientation and a preferential access to a network of companies.
Empirically, the paper is based on 6 months of ethnographic data collected in Den-
mark in one of the first known networked incubators. Their main theoretical contri-
bution is that ‘BIs can be seen as attempts to address market failures and the problem
of a three-dimensional liability of newness’ ([9], p. 284): One dimension relates to
administrative support, the second dimension relates to age and related lack of
visibility in the market and the third relates to being on your own versus being in a
‘community’. They also provide evidence that (1) close physical proximity (e.g.
being located on the same floor) plays a vital role in networking; (2) nurturing social
capital needs some kind of investment and “some of the primary costs are paid for in
the form of time invested in social activities and ‘small talk’” ([9], p. 284), (3) in
networked incubators the line of demarcation between ‘private’ and ‘business’ is
increasingly blurred and (4) unless the importance of social networks is addressed, it
may be difficult to realize the full potential of business incubators. The main
implication for research of this ethnographic study is that ‘no one model can account
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for the complex social dynamics at work, nor can studies, such as this, present a
universal solution. Due attention will have to be given to the specific context and
circumstances’ ([9], p. 286) in order to ‘avoid the trap of methodological and
theoretical fundamentalism’ ([9], p. 286).
Singh and Jain [46] argue that two important elements of incubator services are
often overlooked when incubator performance is measured: cluster development and
‘facilitation of social network-building activities’ that are relevant in a given region
(p. 256). Based on Silicon Valley experience, they conclude that: ‘Incubators should
focus on attracting firms and entrepreneurs that have solutions, technologies and
services that are relevant to local issues. [..] In addition, efforts should be made to
attract to the incubator, similar firms that work within the same industry. This helps
build a critical mass of people who can both compete and collaborate with one
another’ ([46], p. 256). So that Singh and Jain [46] root the idea of ‘networked
incubator’ in a region, social community and single industry, suggesting that it is
within these conditions that incubators provide the best performance. An effort
should be made to develop the network potential through a ‘virtual incubator’, in
order to develop opportunities and exchange ‘best practices’ with other economic
development groups. They suggest that the Silicon Valley phenomenon and the role
that business incubators had in that case could be replicated in other geographical area
‘with time and careful planning’ ([46], p. 253).
Discussion
The present systematic literature review of scholarly peer reviewed journals reveals
that, despite the popularity and diffusion of business incubators, a proper theory of
business incubation is basically nonexistent and theoretical contributions to that
purpose are limited and sketchy. The main consequence is that no clear guidelines
and criteria are available to decide when and where a business incubator should be
established or what it should do and how it should be managed in order to be
effective. Despite that, based on the theoretical knowledge already available in the
cited literature, an attempt can be made in order to draft some principles or propo-
sitions about the establishment and management of business incubators. Such prin-
ciples or propositions are not that interlocked and complete system of propositions
that make a theory of business incubation but they can provide some guidelines and
criteria for deciding how to set up and manage a business incubator.
Prior to drafting the principles, let us start with a definition. Based on the literature
review, the most clear and comprehensive definition of business incubator is the one
provided by Bergek and Norrman [8], in which the incubator is intended as a
‘protected space’ for start ups and fledgling companies made up of four main
components: (1) shared office space, which is rented under more or less
favourable conditions to incubatees; (2) a pool of shared support services to
reduce overhead costs; (3) professional business support or advice (‘coaching’)
and (4) network provision, internal and/or external. The concepts of ‘protected
space’ and ‘shared office space’ can also be extended to a ‘virtual space’,
considered the progress in new technologies and the opportunity to have a
virtual office space. The relative emphasis on each component is different in
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different authors and has varied over time, but all the four components are
fundamental for identifying a business incubator.
As a second step, in order to draft principles or propositions that make a business
incubator ‘effective’, it is necessary to define its goals, as different incubator goals
require different incubator models and different models produce different outcomes
and performances and so different evaluations of ‘effectiveness’. In general, different
goals depend on different stakeholders (and in the case of business incubation there
can be very different stakeholders: national, regional or local policy makers; a
university; a public or private research lab; the incubator owner) but the same stake-
holders can also have different goals. In fact, measuring outcomes without putting
them in relation to different stakeholders and their different goals is meaningless [41],
and comparisons should only be made between incubators that have the same goals:
If the main stakeholder is a regional policy maker and the goal is to enhance
economic development and create jobs locally, a good indicator is the increase in
the number of employees in a region, whereas if the main stakeholder is the national
policy maker, the regional dimension is not relevant; if the main stakeholder is a
university and the goal is to commercialise and transfer research ideas to raise funds,
growth in sales is a suitable indicator, whereas if the main stakeholder is still a
university but the goal is stimulating firms involved in emerging technologies,
the number of new patents could be a better indicator; if the main stakeholder
is the owner of a private incubator and the goal is to maximize return on real
estate investment, the amounts of collected rents, the number of tenants and the
overall incubator profit are better indicators; if, at one extreme, the main
stakeholder is a policy maker and the goal is to attract EU public money to
a region, as seems to be the case of Lithuania, a good indicator should be the
number of EU projects that have been approved and the overall flow of EU
public money into the region.
That said, in drafting the following principles or propositions, I make a choice
among the different models of business incubators and assume that the incubator’s
main stakeholder is a regional policy maker whose main goal is to promote sustain-
able and qualified employment in a region, through the creation of innovative and
technology based new ventures.
Principle 1—Keep Market Forces Out of the Incubator A business incubator must be
a ‘space protected from market forces’ intended to promote the growth of ‘weak-but-
promising’ ventures, so that introducing market criteria inside the incubator (such as
selecting the strongest ventures or the one that would pay higher rents or the ones that
would be selected by private ventures in the market or the ones that operate in more
secure markets, such as accounting firms, legal firms or traditional testing labs)
increases the static efficiency of the incubator [20] but decreases its dynamic effi-
ciency and moves it away from its goals. This principle is only partially present in
Maital et al. [30] as they conceive it as a ‘paradox of market emulation’ or a trade off
between the need to imitate markets in order to increase efficiency and the need to
shield new ventures from markets in order to protect them, whereas I conceive it as
keeping the market out of the incubator in order to promote dynamic efficiency
instead of static efficiency: ‘A system—any system, economic or other—that at every
point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long
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run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, because the latter’s
failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long run performance’
([44], p. 83), so that keeping market forces out of the incubator is not to the detriment
of efficiency in general (it is to the detriment of static efficiency in the short run) but a
precondition for innovation and dynamic efficiency: ‘this ability to hold off market
forces (at least temporarily) enables organizations to pursue innovative activities’
([17], p. 34). In general, introducing market mechanisms and prices inside firms, as if
there were no significant differences between markets and firms, misses the very
fundamental nature of the firm and the fact that it ‘puts purpose above price’ ([17], p.
37), but this is especially dangerous and detrimental to innovation inside organiza-
tions that should ‘incubate’ ‘infant firms’: ‘A market that puts purpose above price
degenerates rapidly, as the erstwhile Soviet system has shown. Similarly, an organi-
zation that puts its faith in prices above purpose fails, too’ ([17], p. 37). Indeed,
putting price above purpose in a business incubator would be like feeding infants
according to a market based mechanism! Everything would be lost: both the incuba-
tor competitive advantage in promoting innovation and dynamic efficiency and the
weak-but-promising infant ventures: ‘purpose provides the ultimate source of an
organization’s advantage over markets and must lie at the core of any theory that
[..] does not assume organizations emerge when markets fail but identifies markets as
beginning where organizations fail’ ([17], p. 37). In conclusion, I adopt the general
concept from Schumpeter [44] as Ghoshal and Moran [17] have applied it to
management studies and I apply it to business incubation in order to revise the partial
intuition of Maital et al. [30].
Principle 2—in Business Incubation, It Is Critical to Take the Region into Account:
(a) When Choosing the Incubator Location, (b) When Selecting Ventures and (c)
When Coaching and Supporting the Incubated Ventures (a) A region needs to have a
sufficiently large population and advanced economy in order to reach agglomeration
economies and host a business incubator [7]. It must also possess a strong university
or other research-oriented organisation in the region [42]. Of course, these factors are
not sufficient to ensure the expected outcomes [1] and are mediated by facility
management [42] and external linkages that develop between business incubators
and other regional and national networked organisations that support entrepreneur-
ship and innovation [9, 22]: ‘Due attention will have to be given to the specific
context and circumstances’ in order to ‘avoid the trap of methodological and theo-
retical fundamentalism’ ([9], p. 286), so that the success of a business incubator
depends on the regional innovation system and the general regional environment and
what might or might not occur is contextually determined because ‘business incuba-
tors are idiosyncratic reflections of local conditions’ ([2], p. 74) and a management
practice that is effective in one place may not be effective in another. As an exception
to this general rule, some outcomes will, in spite of context, lead to minimal perform-
ances, while others will reflect the potential of context and offer spectacular success
stories, depending on different histories and chain of events [27]. However, success
stories are not very likely to reoccur in other regions and times and can—if at all—
only be developed in the very long run [46]. Smaller regions with research organ-
isations are more suitable for profit-making business incubators so as to avoid
complete dependence on public funding and political will, with the unavoidable
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consequence that all the efforts of the incubator management will not be on the
coaching and support of tenants but on public fundraising and EU project drafting
[18]; in any case, it is more difficult for a technology-oriented business incubator to
survive if it is not located in a sizable region. Finally, it is important to note that the
higher the number of established business incubators in a region, the less likely the
success of any new incubator [29]. (b) Incubators should select ventures, whose
solutions, technologies and services are relevant to the regional economy or can have
an impact on it. These will allow firms within the incubator to develop a base of local
clients which will help develop the regional economy. The incubator should select
similar ventures that work within the same industry, so as to build a critical mass of
people who can both compete and collaborate with one another and develop a cluster
[46]. It is clear from the first principle that selection should not be biased towards
ventures paying the higher rents or that already show the best survival chances, such
as ‘anchor tenants’ [40]: Selection should ‘put purpose above price’ and should take
the region fully into account. (c) As argued by Maital et al. [30], different countries
have different key constraints (in India it is funding, in Israel it is experienced
managerial capacity) and different cultures, but this is true also at the regional level
and in the same country: Coaching and supporting should help ventures dealing with
key regional constraints and should take into account cultural differences, for exam-
ple, regarding the incubator manager commitment of time to ‘interdependent co-
production of services’ ([40], p. 163) or type of services provided and management
style.
Principle 3—Business Incubation Is a Process, Option-Driven and Based on
Interdependent Co-production Relationships Among Incubatees, Incubator Man-
agement and External Networked Actors The concept of business incubation as an
‘option driven process’ [20], based on ‘interdependent co-production relationships’
[40] among ‘networked actors’ [9] that we have found in the literature is the most
suitable to catch the intangibility, uncertainty and relational nature of the phenome-
non. It is also the most suited to avoid the ‘real estate drift’ that characterizes many
business incubators [48]. The most relevant implication of the principle is that real
estate investments and tangible infrastructures are not an essential ingredient of
business incubation and should be pursued only when it is demonstrated that they
support the business incubation process better than a ‘virtual incubator’ [50]. Under
these assumptions, business incubation performance may be considered as a function
of the incubator’s ability to create options through selection, monitoring, counselling,
allocation of resources and containment of terminal option failure [20]. The focus on
family businesses inside incubators by Burnett and McMurray [10] supports the
principle, as it highlights the importance of personal relationships and trust inside
incubators, as opposed to market relations.
Principle 4—Public Support Is Indispensable to Protect and Promote the Growth of
‘Weak-but-Promising’ Innovative Ventures in Less Endowed Regions and a ‘Virtual
Incubator’ Approach Can Avoid the Expensive Establishment of Incubators in
Regions That Cannot Support Them Young-Ho Nam [55] has found evidence that
‘government labs are more favourable incubators than private labs, in that govern-
ment labs provide more autonomy in carrying out projects and wider viewpoints in
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understanding an industry or market’ (p. 295), while private-funded incubators seem
to be more suitable in very endowed regions [22] or smaller regions with research
organizations [18]. If, at one extreme, it may be suggested ‘technology-oriented
business incubators should be run as private organisations without public funding’
([48], p. 469), in order to avoid any possible waste of public money and any risk of
establishing high-tech incubators in regions that lack the critical economic mass or
knowledge environment to support them, it seems unlikely that a ‘weak-but-promis-
ing’ new venture will survive in a poorly endowed region if incubator protection and
assistance is not provided in its infancy. The ‘virtual incubator’ [50] approach and the
use of new technologies could both combine public support for ‘weak-but-promising’
ventures in less endowed regions and avoid expensive real estate investments in
regions that lack the resources to support a business incubator. Indeed, the idea of a
‘virtual incubator’ has been thought for Silicon Valley [46], but it is in emerging
economies and less endowed regions that it can be more effective in order to cut
distances and as a less expensive step in building a cluster: ‘Leveraging information
technology, a virtual incubator should be developed that highlights client firm
capabilities, technologies and milestones [..]. Most states and regional areas have
many individual economic development centres [..]. These can also be linked togeth-
er as part of the virtual incubator, as well as any influential individuals who serve as
advisors’ ([46], p. 259). This fourth principle is also supported by Carayannis and von
Zedtwitz [11], who provide an overarching incubator model and guidelines for
designing a ‘gloCal, real and virtual network of incubators (G-RVIN)’. G-RVIN is
a ‘knowledge and innovation infra-structure and infra-technology’, with local pres-
ence and global reach, to link local and global actors and leverage the diverse
divides. The present contribution is to be understood complementary to their
findings: while they emphasise the potential of virtual incubation in less
developed economies as a way to link them to actors in developed economies—‘G-
RVIN model may be particularly helpful in less-developed economies, where
incubators can help bridge knowledge, digital, socio-political and even cultural
divides’ ([11], p. 109)—the present principle focuses on the risks of ineffectiveness
and unsustainability of business incubation in less endowed regions and conceive
‘virtual incubation’ as a smart way to both avoid the physical establishment of costly,
ineffective real estate investments and stimulate entrepreneurship where it is more
needed.
Conclusions
Based on a systematic literature review and systematization of already existent
theoretical knowledge, four principles have been proposed and drafted:
1. Protect weak-but-promising ventures from the market and do not emulate the
market in the incubator.
2. Take the region fully into account: when deciding about establishing the incubator,
when selecting ventures, when providing business support to the selected ventures.
3. Consider business incubation as a process, option-driven, relational and network-
based, not as a tangible investment.
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4. Take advantage of new technologies and a ‘virtual incubation’ approach to bring
public supported business incubation into regions that cannot support a business
incubator.
The four principles are an attempt to provide a set of guidelines and criteria in order to
decide when a business incubator can be established and how it should be run, under
the assumption that the main stakeholder, and thus the goal, is public and regional.
The present research has two main limits. The first one is that the systematic
literature review, on which the four principles above have been drafted, has been
limited by choice to: (1) scholarly peer reviewed journals that can be retrieved in the
ABI/inform database and in the EBSCO database and (2) containing in the title or
abstract: business incubat* and theor*. That resulted in the identification of 34
articles and full text reading of a small pool of 21 articles (among which just 17
were relevant). It is obvious that relevant theoretical contributions about business
incubation may be contained: (1) in publications that are not scholarly peer reviewed
journals, such as book chapters and other journals, or scholarly peer reviewed
journals that are not included in the ABI/inform database and in the EBSCO database
and (2) in scholarly peer reviewed journals containing in the title or abstract just the
word business incubat* and not the word theor* (by using the only keyword business
incubat* resulted in larger pool of 206 articles in the ABI/inform database and 140 in
EBSCO—duplicated articles included). The first choice is justified by the rigour that
scholarly peer reviewed journals provide, especially in the field of theory building,
and by the fact that the most relevant journals are in the ABI/inform and EBSCO
database. The second choice is justified by the fact that I have assumed that the word
theor* (and not only business incubat*) should also be included in the title or abstract
if a significant theoretical contribution was claimed; in addition, that has eliminated
from the analysis the numerous descriptive case studies of business incubators.
Nonetheless, a future research path could extend the systematic literature review to
all the scholarly peer reviewed journals containing the word business incubat*,
descriptive case studies included, looking for whatever theoretical contribution they
may contain despite the lack of a theoretical contribution in the abstract.
The second limit of the present research is related to the four principles themselves
and how they were conceived and drafted. They significantly extend, integrate and
modify the principles that have been identified by Maital et al. [30] or, at least, they
use those principles as a starting point, so that they are not a jump into the unknown
but a leap forward. Nonetheless, the link between systematic literature review results
and identification and drafting of principles is still very subjective and uncertain. It is
hoped that other researchers will conduct a literary replication of this systematic
literature review and will apply their talents to revising these principles or synthesis-
ing more effectively the already existent theoretical knowledge about business
incubation.
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